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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY  
On 10 January 2012, the Project Complaint Mechanism (PCM) Officer of the 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) received a complaint 
regarding Rivne Kyiv High Voltage Line Project in Ukraine. The complaint was 
found eligible for a Compliance Review and Prof Geert Van Calster was appointed as 
the Compliance Review Expert for the Complaint. 
The Complaint alleges that the Project has failed to comply with the EBRD’s 2003 
Environmental and Social Policy (ESP). Two grounds of alleged non-compliance with 
the 2003 EBRD Environmental Policy were withheld for review and have been 
examined in current Compliance Review:  
a.  The alleged failure of the Bank to ensure that a comprehensive, and therefore 
adequate, Environmental Impact Assessment was carried out in respect of the 
Project, including consideration of Parts C and D; and  
b. The alleged failure of the Bank to ensure disclosure and meaningful public 
consultation in respect of Parts C and D.  
 
Based on extensive due diligence of the project planning and execution stages, 
the information available regarding the extent of the project and details of same, 
to EBRD and others at various intervals, and on the Bank’s obligations under 
the 2003 Environmental policy, the Compliance Review Expert has not withheld 
any finding of non-compliance in respect of any of the grounds set out in the 
Complaint. Parts C and D of the Project were justifiably not included in the 2007 
ESIA: their technical detail was not known nor could have been known at the 
time, and they ought not to have been included in the ESIA. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In respect of the Rivne Kyiv High Voltage Line Project two grounds of alleged non-
compliance with the 2003 EBRD Environmental Policy were withheld and have been 
examined in current Compliance Review:  
a.  The alleged failure of the Bank to ensure that a comprehensive, and therefore 
adequate, Environmental Impact Assessment was carried out in respect of the 
Project, including consideration of Parts C and D; and  
b. The alleged failure of the Bank to ensure disclosure and meaningful public 
consultation in respect of Parts C and D.  
Broken down into its essence, current compliance review has had to review two main 
strands. The first one is a review of factual due diligence, the other a review of the 
precise scope and legal nature of the term 'project' in the corresponding obligations 
under applicable environmental law, and the extent to which the project met with the 
ensuing requirements. 
 
2. The complaint and the initial response by the EBRD 
2.1 The Complainant: The National Ecological Centre of Ukraine 
Complainant argues that there has been a failure on behalf of the EBRD to: 
a. Ensure a comprehensive and therefore adequate ESIA of the Project  including 
consideration of Part C and D of the project, and to  
b. Ensure disclosure and meaningful public consultation of the same Part C and 
D. 
Complainant argues that 'damage' has been inflicted, in particular1 that “the 
demonstrated difference in what was appraised and approved from one side and what 
was agreed for financing from another might undermine the public trust in seriousness 
of EBRD fundamental commitments declared by environmental policy’.2 Hence 
alleged harm lies in the alleged violation of trust in the Bank’s process, rather than in 
any physical or material harm resulting from the project. 
Complainant proposes as a remedy for the alleged failure, a compliance review of the 
Rivne-Kyiv High Voltage Line project “to prevent a repeat of such flaws in the 
future” 3.  
 
                                                        
1 References to delays in the project and to often consequential impacts on the Ukrainian taxpayer have not been 
held to be relevant for current review. 
2 National Ecological Centre of Ukraine, Complaint of 12 01 2012, p.3. 
3 EBRD PCM Eligibility Assessment Report, p 1. See also Complainant’s Letter, Annex 1 to the Assessment 
Report. 
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2.2 Bank Management: The EBRD 
In response, EBRD management essentially argues that  
 
a. The EBRD is not financing Part D, which will be financed by EIB. As a result 
the EBRD is not responsible for conducting an ESIA on Part D.4  
b. The project Part D, the original concept, was identified as part of the Project 
during the TDD in 2007 but not included in the ESIA as its design was not 
available at that stage.    
c. The need for Part D was only determined after the ESIA was concluded, 
following completion of the technical due diligence, 'TDD'. 
d. The design and construction of Part D were scheduled to take place several 
years in the future. 
e. The Lenders therefore required Ukrenergo to commit to undertake a separate 
ESIA and public consultation in accordance with the EBRD and EIB 
respective requirements for Part D at the appropriate time when detailed 
information on the line route was available. These requirements went into the 
Project Implementation Plan, a document which must at all times (as updated) 
be to the Lenders’ satisfaction under the financing agreements. 
 
2.3 The Client: Ukrenergo 
The Client, Ukrenergo, 
a. accepts that Part D did not undergo an ESIA in May 2007. However, it points 
out that the Loan Agreement between the Client and the EIB expressly 
provides for an ESIA for these components once more details are available.5 
b. notes that the sites for Part D had not been selected in May 2007, hence it was 
impossible to hold public hearings. 
c. states that it was the EIB that suggested Part D in the course of 2007. 
d. notes that permission for routing Part D was only given by the State 
Administration in December 2012 so that only now can they begin to 
undertake scoping and conduct a thorough ESIA. 
e. is willing to pay for an independent consultant, to assist it with the 
development of Part D. 
f. notes that the appointment of the contractor and assessment of Part D was due 
to take place in April 2012. 
 
3. Objective of the compliance review and two main strands of review 
The PCM Eligibility Assessors found the complaint to be eligible for a Compliance 
Review.. The purpose of the Compliance Review, therefore, is to determine, “if (and 
if so, how and why) any EBRD action, or failure to act, in respect of the Project has                                                         
4 Ibidem, Annex 2 – not page numbered. The heading in the body of the text here is a summary of all the Bank’s 
Management responses. 
5 Annex 3 to the Eligibility Assessment Report, “Client’s Response” as well as PCM team summary of Client’s 
response, p 9 - 10. 
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resulted in non-compliance with a relevant EBRD’s 2003 Environmental Policy. If in 
the affirmative, to recommend remedial changes.”6 
Broken down into its essence, current Compliance Review has had to review two 
main strands.  
Firstly, as the summary of the arguments of the various parties involved shows, there 
would seem to be disagreement on what was and was not, factually, included in the 
project scope at the time of pivotal moments in the decision-making process. This has 
required a due diligence of the considerable stream of documents handled between the 
EBRD, Client, the EIB, and various consultants recruited to the process. Especially if 
‘project’ under relevant ESIA rules were to be held to refer to a particular moment in 
time (a cut-off moment, as it were, at which precise point the extent of what is and 
what is not to be included in the ESIA would be judged),7 and hence the scope of 
what ought to have been included in particular in the briefing of the EBRD Board 
were to be determined at that precise moment, one needs to have an insight into what 
was and what was not contemplated by the EBRD and its Environment and 
Sustainability Team at that moment.  
Secondly, a review of the precise scope and legal nature of the term 'project' under the 
rules applicable to EBRD projects, and the extent to which the project met with the 
ensuing requirements.  
 
4. Factual due diligence: what was under contemplation by the EBRD at the 
time of project approval 
4.1 Background to the project 
The Rivne Kyiv High Voltage Line Project  (The Project) aims to reinforce the 
electrical connections between Ukraine’s western and southern borders. It forms part 
of an overall drive to modernise the entire electricity grid of Ukraine. In 2006 the 
Ukrainian government stated that the Rivne Kyiv Voltage Line Project was its top 
priority.8 To help fund the modernisation of this line the Ukrainian state applied for 
and was granted EBRD and EIB loans. 
Under the EBRD 2003 Environmental Policy the construction of electricity lines is 
classified as a Category A Project. As such there is no doubt that the EBRD and EIB 
loans are conditional upon Ukrenergo conducting a full Environment Social Impact 
Assessment (ESIA) in due course.   
 
Between February 2007 and May 2007 Ukrenergo (variously known in the documents 
as ‘The Client’ or ‘The Promoter’ 9) conducted an ESIA on the Project with the 
support of a Consultant. The EBRD assisted in the process10, as is standard.                                                         
6 Ibidem, p 18. 
7 Whether EIA involves a cut-off moment or not will be reviewed in the legal analysis, further in this report. 
8 Ukrenergo Terms of Reference, p.2. (Aug Jul Sep Nov 2006).  
9 ‘Promoter’ or ‘promotor’ is the term which corresponds most closely to the concept of ‘developer’ in the relevant 
European Union directives, in particular the EIA Directive, as codified in Directive 2011/92, OJ [2012] L26/1: 
Article 1(b): ‘developer’ means the applicant for authorisation for a private project or the public authority which 
initiates a project; 
10 Environmental and Social Summary – Concept Review, 6 December 2006. 
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4.2 The Project: Definition and Scope 
It is clear from the file that, quite aside from the legal concept of ‘project’, the exact 
scope, definition and boundaries of what exactly was being financed, was not defined 
in equal detail throughout the approval process, up to and beyond the EBRD’s 
decision to finance. 
At its simplest the Project refers to  
 
“a 350 km new high voltage transmission line, routed in a new corridor in the 
western region of Ukraine”.11   
 
Beyond that there is no consistency as to the Project’s scope which varies from year 
to year and from document to document. At its earliest the Project’s definition and 
scope is defined in sentences, later it is variously divided into Parts A – D or 
alternatively as Lots 1-4. The difficulty in determining the Project’s scope is 
complicated by the fact that spellings, places and routes change depending on which 
document is being consulted. 
Having regard to the Terms of Reference for this Compliance Review prepared by the 
Eligibility Assessors and included in the Eligibility Assessment Report, the 
Compliance Review Expert conducted a thorough review of all relevant Project 
documentation and of relevant internal and external Bank correspondence.  The 
Compliance Review Expert is of the opinion that he has had access to sufficient 
information to consider the Bank’s alleged non-compliance with the requirements of 
the 2003 Environmental Policy (EP) as regards the present Project.  
It should be noted generally in relation to the conduct of this Compliance Review that 
the Compliance Review Expert has adopted as rigorous a standard of review as 
possible in seeking to identify instances of non-compliance with the EP.  In carrying 
out the present Compliance Review, therefore, the Compliance Review Expert, while 
subjecting the Bank’s conduct of the stipulated environmental appraisal processes to a 
rigorous examination for the purpose of identifying any actions or omissions which 
objectively would amount to ‘non-compliance with a Relevant EBRD Policy’12, has 
also found it pertinent to have regard to the Bank's policy on disclosure of documents 
in line with the 2011 Public Information Policy of the EBRD.13  
The Compliance Review Expert  has reviewed a large amount of documents, which 
were made available to him, partially at the own initiative of the EBRD, partially 
following a request by the expert to have access to the file as a whole. The expert 
wishes to note that the approach of Compliance Review and of the Environment and 
Sustainability team has been one of complete openness and transparency. The expert 
has been able to review the largest possible amount of documents and electronic 
correspondence of relevance to the file. For reasons of confidentiality, not all 
documents can similarly be opened up for general public access. However, in offering                                                         
11 Environmental and Social Summary – Concept Review, 6 December 2006, Point 6. 
12 PCM Rules of Procedure, para. 36. 
13 EBRD Public Information Policy as approved by the Board of Directors at its meeting on 26/27 July 2011, 
http://www.ebrd.com/downloads/policies/pip/pipe.pdf. 
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the timeline and contents below, all facts of relevance to current compliance review 
are available to complainant and to the interested public. 
The documents presented here are selected from a large amount of correspondence 
and documents reviewed by the Compliance Review  Expert. They represent an 
overall pattern, rather than being exclusively relevant to the case at issue. 
The timeline of relevance to the issue under consideration, is as follows:  
 
2006 
2006 “Terms of Reference Ukraine –750 kv Rivne-NPP-Kyiv substation high voltage 
transmission project” written by Innogate. 
 
January 2007 
An ‘Environmental Impact Assessment /Scoping document 
 
February 2007 
Consultation Process Minutes of Consultation Meeting held end February 2007 and 
organised by Ukrenergo and EBRD (March 07). 
 
24 April 2007 
Initial ESIA report prepared by the Consultant 
 
4 May 2007 
Draft ESIA prepared by the consultant 
 
14 May 2007 
A similar draft ESIA submitted for comment 
 
16 May 2007 
UKENERGO response to the Consultant 
 
27 May 2007 
Amendment of draft ESIA 
 
30 May 2007 
Issuing of the draft ESIA to the Public for comment. 
 
6 November 2007 
Description of the Project included in the Board Document and approved by EBRD 
Board of Directors on this date.   
 
28 February 2008 
Loan Agreement between Ukraine and the EBRD 
 
23 July 2008 
Draft “Financial Contract” between the EIB and the Ukraine 
 
May 2011 
Contract signed with a service provider 
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2 November 2011 
Project Implementation Plan (PIP) 
 
12 November 2012 
EBRD PCM Eligibility Assessment Report 
Detailed review of the scope of the ‘project’ in these documents reveals in particular 
that the need for the construction of a number of 330 kV lines was clear from the start. 
Some of these were nearing completion at the time of EBRD financing and had been 
wholly financed by Ukrenergo. Of others, in particular those that later became part C 
and D of the project, only the need was projected, not the design neither the route. 
Part C and D however were part of the overall project, finance for which was to be 
provided by EBRD and EIB, even if design and route for these parts were not known 
at the time of financing. There were no explicit references to projects that became 
parts C and D in the publicly available ESIA, released to the public in 30 May 200714, 
however in this document, too, it was acknowledged that additional projects would be 
undertaken to achieve the project's objectives, without being within the scope of the 
ESIA. Particular reference was made to the modernization of the 750 kV Kyiv 
substation, which, it was said, required upgrading works in order to be able to 
accommodate the new transmission line  
At the end of 2007, documents sent to the EBRD Board of Directors formally classify 
the project into parts A through to D. The February 2008 Loan Agreement between 
Ukraine and the EBRD, too, specifically includes Parts C and D nominatim.  
 
4.3 Intermediate conclusion on project scope factually being within the 
purview of the EBRD 
The ESIA itself did not classify the projects into Parts A, B, C and D. The project was 
simply classified into bullet points. Yet, the Agreement between EBRD and Ukraine, 
concluded a few months after the ESIA, does classify the project into parts A-D, as 
did documents seen by the Board a few months earlier.  
The Complainant correctly identifies that Parts C and D were implied in the project 
scope as identified in ESIA – even if not expressly stated, and not included in the 
actual ESIA study. However this implication in the ESIA, made in particular by 
referring to the need for further modernisation and upgrade, was not supplemented 
with the type of technical detail which parts A and B did already have at the time. 
The Complainant notes that Part C and Part D were, moreover, specifically mentioned 
in the Loan Agreement between the EBRD and the Ukraine signed on 28 February 
2008,15 as indeed they were.  
                                                         
14 ESIA May 2007, p 2, http://www.ebrd.com/english/pages/project/eia/37598.pdf  
15 The 2008 EBRD Loan Agreement available to Complainant was drafted in Ukrainian/Russian. The Project 
Implementation Plan (PIP) is updated on a regular basis to take account of changing circumstances. The one 
reviewed by the Compliance Review Expert was revised on 2 November 2011. The latest PIP divides the Project 
into Lots 1-4.  
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5. ‘Projects’ in International and EU EIA law 
5.1 The general interpretative context of the EIA requirements 
The core legal issue in the review of current complaint, is whether the Bank should 
have insisted on inclusion of what came to be known as parts C and D of the ‘project’, 
in the ESIA carried out for said project, including  public consultation, and what 
would have to be completed prior to the Board of Directors being asked to review the 
project16.  
It is clear from the above factual due diligence that the need for what was to become 
parts C and D of the project, was firmly within the contemplation of the Bank’s 
compliance agents from the very initiation of the file. The crucial consideration in the 
bank’s response (which shall be further reviewed in detail below, Heading 6) is 
whether the more or less distant reality in practice, of parts of or indeed natural 
continuation of a project, and the absence at the time of approval of technical detail 
for same, impacts on the Bank’s duty to have those realities reflected in the EIA. 
Proper assessment of that consideration requires analysis of the EIA obligations 
applicable to the Bank in considering support for the project. As noted above, the 
2003 Environmental Policy reads in relevant part (para 21): 
‘The EBRD requires that projects that it finances meet good international 
environmental practice. Therefore, the EBRD will require that projects be structured 
so as to meet: (i) applicable national environmental law; and (ii) EU environmental 
standards, insofar as these can be applied to a specific project. Where such standards 
do not exist or are inapplicable, the EBRD shall identify other sources of good 
international practice, including relevant World Bank Group guidelines, the 
approach of other IFIs and donors, and good industry practice, and require 
compliance with the selected standards.  
It has already been established in EBRD Compliance Review17, inter alia in view of 
the express reference in the 2003 Policy to the Espoo Convention on Environmental 
Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context; the close correspondence between 
the Espoo Convention and EU law with respect to EIA; and EU law reflecting 
international practice, that the EU’s EIA Directive and relevant case-law of the ECJ 
on this subject, are to be taken into account as corresponding obligations for the 
EBRD in its application of the 2003 policy and as playing guiding roles in the 
application of same.  
Environmental Impact Assessment is a process – not a guarantor of a particular 
outcome.  
An environmental impact assessment (EIA) describes a process that produces a 
written statement to be used to guide decision-making, with several related functions. 
First, it should provide decision-makers with information on the environmental 
consequences of proposed activities and, in some cases, programmes and policies, 
and their alternatives. Second, it requires decisions to be influenced by that 
information. And, third, it provides a mechanism for ensuring the participation of                                                         
16 Of note is that the EBRD does not carry out the EIA itself, neither indeed to any authorities subject to EIA 
obligations. EIA is carried out under responsibility of the developer, with supervision by the relevant authorities, in 
casu with the EBRD having to review compliance with EBRD requirements of same prior to deciding to fund. 
17 See in particular EBRD Compliance Review Report relating to the Vlorë thermal power generation project, 17 
April 2008, paras 26 ff. 
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potentially affected persons in the decision-making process.18 (emphasis in the 
original) 
Along similar lines, EIA needs to be thought of as  
iterative processes, where information that comes to light is fed back into the 
decision-making process.19 
Previous EBRD compliance review reports have noted in this respect  
it must be borne in mind that the EIA is but a legally mandated procedural technique 
for integrating environmental considerations into the decision-making processes 
regarding certain development projects. Its purpose is to provide a system whereby 
decision-makers are provided with material information with respect to the likely 
environmental consequences of a certain proposed project and their alternatives and, 
in so doing, it facilitates the participation of potentially affected persons or interested 
groups in the decision-making process. The EIA, therefore, generally involves 
procedural requirements rather than substantive rules or environmental standards 
and provides a formal route by which information is to enter decision-making 
procedures, but it does not determine the outcome of those procedures.20 
It is with these general aims in mind, that compliance with the EBRD 2003 
Environmental Policy needs to be reviewed.  
ESIA regulates a process, not a particular outcome. It is fair to say that in regulating 
behaviour rather than substantial outcome, EIA requirements necessarily lack the 
level of precision which product- or outcome driven law may achieve. As a result, 
case-law on the precise obligations is relatively frequent, however, they concern 
mostly the decision whether or not to conduct an E(S)IA at all, rather than the scope 
of such. 
The European Commission, in its 2009 report on the application of the corresponding 
EU Directive, summarises relevant case-law as follows: 
The ECJ has emphasised that the Directive is broad in scope and purpose and 
confines the MS' degree of discretion. Most of the ECJ rulings focus on "screening" 
and the decision as to whether or not to carry out an EIA. The ECJ has also provided 
interpretations of some of the project categories and the concept of "development 
consent", and has dealt with the issue of retention permissions.21 
 
5.2 ‘Project’ as defined in the corresponding obligations of the EIA Directive 
Article 1(2)(a) of the Directive defines ‘project’ as  
(a) ‘project’ means:  
— the execution of construction works or of other installations or schemes,                                                          
18 Sands, P, and Peel, J. (with Adriana Fabra and Ruth MacKenzie), Principles of International environmental law, 
3rd ed., Cambridge, CUP, 2012, p.601. 
19 Bell, S., and McGillivray, D., Environmental Law, Oxford, OUP, 6th ed. 2006, p.509. 
20 EBRD Compliance Review Report relating to the Vlorë thermal power generation project, 17 April 2008, para 
24-25. 
21 Commission report of 23 July 2009 on the application and effectiveness of the EIA directive, COM(2009) 378, 
at 2.3. 
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— other interventions in the natural surroundings and landscape including those 
involving the extraction of mineral resources; 
This definition is of not much use or controversy for current review. ‘Projects’ subject 
to ESIA are necessarily ‘draft’ or ‘planned’ projects: for SESA works proactively, 
considering a project’s environmental22 impact prior to permission being granted. The 
challenge in current review, concerns the application of ESIA to ‘incremental’ 
projects: projects which develop in stages.  
With respect to corresponding obligations, the ECJ has unequivocally rejected inter 
alia in Ecologistas en Acción, the artificial splitting of projects to circumvent EIA 
requirements:  
‘as the Court has already noted with regard to Directive 85/337, the purpose of the 
amended directive cannot be circumvented by the splitting of projects and the failure 
to take account of the cumulative effect of several projects must not mean in practice 
that they all escape the obligation to carry out an assessment when, taken together, 
they are likely to have significant effects on the environment within the meaning of 
Article 2(1) of the amended directive (see, as regards Directive 85/337, Case C-
392/96 Commission v Ireland [1999] ECR I-5901, paragraph 76, and Abraham and 
Others, paragraph 27).’23 
This strict approach of the Court prevents ‘salami’ projects, i.e. artificial splitting up 
in order to remain under relevant thresholds.  
There is no suggestion that in the case at issue, the project was artificially split 
up so as to keep it outside of ESIA requirements: rather, whether the ESIA that 
was carried out included all relevant parts of the project.  
The Court of Justice also held in Ecologistas en Acción that where individual projects 
carried out or planned to be carried out are part of a larger project, the authorities 
giving the go-ahead (and the national courts reviewing compliance with the 
Directive), must judge  
whether they must be dealt with together by virtue, in particular, of their 
geographical proximity, their similarities and their interactions.24 
Relevant case-law with respect to incremental projects, also known as 'cumulative 
assessment' may also be found in the application of Article 1(2)’s ‘development 
consent’.25 With reference to the concept of development consent in Article 1(2) of 
the EIA Directive, the term was found by the ECJ to refer to a single type of consent, 
that is the authorities' decision on whether a project can be proceeded with or not.26  
However, as established in Wells, for multiple staged projects, the  
“effects which the project may have on the environment must be identified and 
assessed at the time of the procedure relating to the principal decision. It is only if 
those effects are not identifiable until the time of the procedure relating to the                                                         
22 A crucial distinction with the SEA Directive being that EIA sees to environmental impact only, not to the 
complete sustainable development picture. 
23 Case C-142/07 Ecologistas en Acción-CODA v Ayuntamiento de Madrid, [2008] ECR I-6097, paragraph 44. 
24 Ibidem, paragraph 45. 
25 Defined as ‘the decision of the competent authority or authorities which entitles the developer to proceed with 
the project’. 
26 Case C-332/04 Commission v. Spain, [2006] ECR I-40, paragraph 53. 
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implementing decision that the assessment should be carried out in the course of that 
procedure.”  
In the case at issue, therefore, applying the Wells criteria, only if the effects of Part C 
and D were not identifiable at that time, ought they not validly to have been included 
in said ESIA. We shall come back to this issue below.  
Judgment in Barker would seem of less precedent value. The ECJ ruled that  
“Articles 2(1) and 4(2) of Directive 85/337 are to be interpreted as requiring an 
environmental impact assessment to be carried out if, in the case of grant of consent 
comprising more than one stage, it becomes apparent, in the course of the second 
stage, that the project is likely to have significant effects on the environment by virtue 
inter alia of its nature, size or location.’ 27 
In Barker, the local authority when issuing outline planning permission ruled that the 
first stages of the project would not have any significant effects on the environment 
and that only at a stage when reserved matters (part of the rolling-out of the planned 
project) would be dealt with, that there might be such effects and hence the need for 
an EIA. In the case at issue, by contrast, the environmental impact of parts A and B 
was never in doubt – rather whether Part C and D ought to have been joined. 
 
5.3 ‘Project’ as defined in the 2003 EBRD environmental policy 
The 2003 EBRD Environmental Policy, which applies to the project under 
consideration, does not define ‘project’28. Of relevance to the current dispute, 
however (in particular: with respect to the co-financing by EIB), is that Para 14 of the 
2003 Policy describes the ‘environmental appraisal process’ with reference to the 
project as a whole, not just the EBRD-financed part:  
‘EBRD-financed projects undergo environmental appraisals both to help the EBRD 
decide if an activity should be financed and, if so, the way in which environmental 
issues should be incorporated in project financing, planning and implementation. The 
EBRD supports a precautionary approach to the assessment of environmental 
impacts.  
The EBRD’s environmental appraisal work will seek to verify that each project in 
which the EBRD invests will be implemented on an environmentally sound basis. It is 
the responsibility of the project sponsor to provide the EBRD with all information 
required for the environmental appraisal to the satisfaction of the EBRD.’ (emphasis 
added) 
Para 20 of the 2003 Policy, too, talk of EBRD- financed projects: projects as a whole: 
not just the EBRD financing of it: see for instance para 21: 
 
                                                        
27 Case C-290/03 Diane Barker v London Borough of Bromley, [2006] ECR I-3949, paragraph 49. 
28 This is in contrast with the 2008 Policy, which defines ‘project’ in para 17 as  
‘In this Policy, the term “project” refers to the business activity for which EBRD financing  is sought by the client 
regardless of the type of EBRD operation. EBRD operations (that is to say, the act of providing financing) 
comprise a range of different types of financing for proposed projects, such as project finance/limited recourse 
finance, corporate finance, working capital, quasi-equity, equity, or grants.’ 
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‘The EBRD requires that projects that it finances meet good international 
environmental practice. Therefore, the EBRD will require that projects be structured 
so as to meet: (i) applicable national environmental law; and (ii) EU environmental 
standards, insofar as these can be applied to a specific project. Where such standards 
do not exist or are inapplicable, the EBRD shall identify other sources of good 
international practice, including relevant World Bank Group guidelines, the 
approach of other IFIs and donors, and good industry practice, and require 
compliance with the selected standards.  
The EBRD will not finance projects that would contravene country obligations under 
relevant international environmental treaties and agreements, as identified during the 
environmental appraisal. In addition, projects will also be structured to meet IFC 
Safeguard Policies on indigenous peoples, involuntary resettlement and cultural 
property,3 if they involve potential impacts related to such matters.’[emphasis added] 
 
6. Whether EBRD practice in current project met with the legal 
requirements 
6.1 Whether Parts of the project are financed by others has no impact on the 
Bank's ESIA requirements 
It has been argued inter alia that because the EBRD is not financing Part D, the EBRD 
is not responsible for conducting an ESIA on Part D. 
That the EBRD are not financing Part D does, indeed, appear to be the case. It is also 
set out in the Board Document sent to the Secretary General for EBRD Board 
Approval in July 2007: 
 
Board Document sent to the EBRD Board of Directors for approval of the Project, July 2007 
Ukrenergo, the Bank and European Investment Bank (EIB) will jointly finance the 
Project, with Bank participating in the financing of the construction of 750 kV 
overhead line between Rivne NPP and the new 750/330 kV Kiev substation. (See 
Annex 3 for line route map.) (Part A and B) EIB will also finance the construction of 
750 kV overhead line, and will finance construction of two 60km 330kV lines from 
Kyiv Substation. Table 2 below summarises the cost estimates and sources of 
financing for each of the Project items. (Part C and D). 29 
 
At what moment exactly the precise co-financing responsibilities for the project 
became clearly defined, is less clear. It would seem that financing in full by the EBRD 
was not envisaged from the start. However, at any rate, and as noted above, the 2003 
Environmental Policy describes the ‘environmental appraisal process’ with reference 
to the project as a whole, not just the EBRD-financed part. Should there be remaining 
doubt - quod certe non - as to the exact nature of the term 'project' in the Policy, 
interpretation of such needs to be guided by the environmental objectives which the 
Policy seeks to serve. Limiting EBRD-disciplined ESIA requirements to those parts of                                                         
29 Memorandum for Board Approval :Ukraine – Rivne - Kyiv High Voltage Line Construction Project, date of 
document  12 October 2007, p.13. 
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the project which are EBRD financed (as the Management’s argument implies, even if 
this was not the factual intention in the case at issue), runs the risk of rendering the 
Policy nugatory: for ESIA could be circumvented simply by removing ESIA sensitive 
parts of the project from EBRD funding, and having these financed by less 
environmentally sensitive means (which could include, self-financing). 
Consequently, the ESIA responsibilities apply to the project as a whole, not just those 
parts of it that are EBRD financed.  
 
6.2 Whether availability of design details has an impact on the extent of the 
EIA 
It has been suggested that project Part D, was identified as part of the Project during 
the TDD in 2007 but not included in the ESIA as its design was not available at that 
stage.  
The Board Document sent to the Board of Directors on the Project appears to confirm 
that this is indeed the case.  
 
Board Document submitted to the EBRD Board of Directors for approval of the Project, 
July 2007 
Environment 
 Screened A/0, requiring an Environmental and Social Impact Assessment (“ESIA”) 
of the 750 kV electricity transmission line from Kiev to Rivne. The Project is just 
one element of a major wide ranging modernization and energy efficiency drive of 
the Ukrainian national grid aimed at increasing reliability.  
 The Project has also been subject to Ukrainian EIA and an additional EIA was 
undertaken by an international consultant to meet EBRD Environmental Policy and 
Procedures for A level projects of this type. It should be noted that the detailed 
designs for instance assessing the location of each pylon will be done by the 
chosen construction contractor at latter date. Therefore the ESIA focused on the 
overall environmental and social impacts and provision of appropriate guidance 
and recommendations for future contractors during the construction process. 
These recommendations are included in the environmental management and 
monitoring plan and any contractor will need to adhere to these requirements. 
(emphasis added)30 
 
 
Following the ECJ's ruling in Ecologistas en Acción, precited31, where individual 
projects carried out or planned to be carried out are part of a larger project, the 
authorities giving the go-ahead must judge                                                          
30 Memorandum for Board Approval :Ukraine – Rivne - Kyiv High Voltage Line Construction Project, date of 
document  12 October 2007, p.11. 
31 Note 23 above. 
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whether they must be dealt with together by virtue, in particular, of their 
geographical proximity, their similarities and their interactions.32 
Per the Wells criteria, referred to above, for multiple staged projects, the  
“effects which the project may have on the environment must be identified and 
assessed at the time of the procedure relating to the principal decision. It is 
only if those effects are not identifiable until the time of the procedure relating 
to the implementing decision that the assessment should be carried out in the 
course of that procedure.” 
Part C and D were firmly within contemplation at the same time as part A and B. 
They are geographically proximate to Parts A and B, and clearly interact with them. 
However their technical detail was not available at the time, nor was that detail 
inevitable (i.e. parts C and D could take a variety of directions). They could not 
therefore have been included in the ESIA. 
 
6.3 Whether the need for Part D was only determined after the ESIA was 
concluded, following completion of the Technical Due Diligence. 
The need for Part D was most definitely present from the very start of EBRD funding 
being considered, as was the need for Part C. What was absent, was the technical 
detail for both parts. Parts C and D were eventually given permission by the relevant 
authorities in the final quarter of 2012.  
 
6.4 Whether the design and construction of Part D were scheduled to take 
place several years in the future. 
Parts C and D were seen from the very beginning as being an essential part of the 
project realising its potential. However as noted above, their technical design was not 
known at the time of the ESIA for the project.  
 
6.5 Whether the appropriate ESIA was carried out at a later date 
The argument has been made that the lenders required Ukrenergo to undertake a 
separate ESIA and public consultation in accordance with the EBRD and EIB 
respective requirements for Part D at the appropriate time when detailed information 
on the line route would become available. A separate ESIA is being conducted by 
Ukrenergo on Part D of the project, and is outside the scope of this Compliance 
Review.  
 
                                                        
32 Ibidem, paragraph 45. 
 15  
7. Whether relevant information was disclosed to the public and whether 
the public was properly consulted on Parts C and D 
Parts C and D were not included in the 2007 ESIA for the reasons pointed out above. 
The ESIA currently being carried out for parts C and D is outside the scope of current 
Compliance Review.  
 
8. Conclusion and recommendations 
Given that  
- There is no suggestion that in the case at issue, the project was artificially split 
up so as to keep it outside of ESIA requirements: rather, whether the ESIA 
that was carried out included all relevant parts of the project.  
- There is a discrepancy in the range, definition and scope of the Project. Its 
contours are fluid and change from document to document.  
- The Complainant correctly identifies that Parts C and D were implied in the 
ESIA – even if not expressly stated.  
Having established  
- That Part C and D were firmly within the contemplation of the EBRD at the 
time of the initiation of the ESIA; however the effects of Part C and D were 
not identifiable at that time, and  they ought not validly to have been included 
in said ESIA. 
- That under the 2003 Environmental Policy ESIA responsibilities apply to the 
project as a whole, not just those parts of it that are EBRD financed.  
- That where individual projects carried out or planned to be carried out are part 
of a larger project, the Bank must assess whether they must be dealt with 
together by virtue, in particular, of their geographical proximity, their 
similarities and their interactions. 
- That Part C and D were firmly within the contemplation of the Bank at the 
same time as part A and B, and that they are geographically proximate to Parts 
A and B, as well as clearly interacting with them; however their technical 
detail was not known nor could have been known at the time, and they ought 
not to have been included in the ESIA.  
- That the claim that “the need for Part D was only determined after the ESIA 
was concluded, following completion of technical due diligence” is incorrect, 
insofar as the future need for what became Part D was firmly established; 
technical detail however for parts C and D was not known at the time.  
 
Finds 
That Parts C and D of the Project were justifiably not included in the 2007 
ESIA and, on this basis, the Compliance Review Expert declines to find that 
EBRD failed to comply with Environmental Policy 2003.    
